In the frenzied coverage of the Trump-Kim summit, it's easy to forget that the unprecedented peace process between the Koreas was already underway.
Alongside denuclearisation, reunification is the biggest potential game-changer on the Korean peninsula. But it remains a pipe dream.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump extend their hands as they meet in Singapore on June 12, 2018. |
By Niki J.P. Alsford, University of Central Lancashire
It seems ages since a lingering handshake began across the
demarcation line that separates North and South Korea. Much has happened
since -- and now, the once unthinkable has happened with a summit
between North Korea's Kim Jong Un and the United States' Donald Trump. But in all the frenzied coverage of that summit -- which yielded an agreement widely considered anemic -- it's easy to forget that the unprecedented peace process between the Koreas was already underway.
A number of pledges were made at the April Inter-Korean Summit between Moon Jae-in,
president of South Korea, and Kim. Among their promises were an
agreement to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
and to convert the Korean Armistice Agreement into a full peace treaty
that would formally end the Korean War after 65 years.
A Korean peace treaty would most likely do three things: formally
designate the two Korea's borders (probably as they currently stand),
put in place certain processes that would resolve any future disputes
and potentially open the North for economic investment and cease current
sanctions. But what about unification? Would a peace treaty end any
prospects of unification, with each country recognizing the other's
existence, or might it install a system of governance that the two
countries could share -- a federal system, for example?
The key question is what Kim really wants. If all he really desires
is a ceremonial role -- devoid of power, but with all the pomp and
circumstance befitting a "supreme leader" -- a unified Korea might look
something like a constitutional monarchy. Kim could be granted
discretionary powers, as is Morocco's Mohammed VI, or hold no formal
authority at all, as does Japan's Emperor Akihito. As in the U.K. and the Commonwealth, he could be "a sovereign who reigns but does not rule."
For many reasons, this is highly unlikely.
Striking a balance
Kim has given no indication that he is interested in relinquishing
any power over his part of the peninsula; nor has Moon. As such, the
most likely outcome is still a peninsula of two Koreas, however cordial
their relationship.
After all, it has been more than 65 years since Korea was unified in
any form. And even then, it was never really formalized after the
Japanese surrender at the end of World War II. Today's younger Koreans
have no memory of the "unifed" state, and more and more young people in
South Korea seem content with the idea of two Koreas. After all, it's
perfectly normal for two countries to share historical heritage and
linguistic background without thinking of themselves as a single
"divided nation."
This fits a global trend toward a world of more smaller countries,
not new larger ones. The only countries growing in size are taking their
new territory by force or subterfuge, as did Russia in its annexation of the Crimea.
If a stable two-country system was to endure, the parties on all
sides would need to accept some inconvenient truths. For a start, North
Korea is a nuclear state, and in a sense always will be; "full"
denuclearization is not possible, because it already knows how to
manufacture a nuclear weapon. The United States will also not leave the
Korean Peninsula entirely because it has another reason to stay there:
to keep a strategic foothold in East Asia so as to mitigate the
influence of China.
Holding on
So what does Kim want in the short term, and what does he need? In
short, a way forward for North Korea that doesn't put his domestic
supremacy at risk. Conventional wisdom has long held that as a country
modernizes its economy, democracy is sure to follow, as happened in both
South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s. But despite initial predictions,
the same effect has not taken hold in China.
Instead, the Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian rule is being consolidated. China's current president, Xi Jinping, only this year announced
that the term limit on his office would be scrapped, potentially
allowing him to rule for life. Xi's example will surely have given Kim
hope that he can modernize North Korea's dismal economy without relaxing
or losing his hold on power.
As the world order becomes more and more dominated by the
relationship between two superpowers, North Korea may once again look to
play China off against its principal rival, as it did in the 1960s
after the Sino-Soviet split.
In so doing, Kim can reap the maximum benefit in terms of economic,
political, and potentially military aid -- all of which will in turn
help him retain power even as North Korea grows and living conditions
there improve.
Aligning
with the United States would be a bold move, but Trump's pride in
"making a deal," however thin, is very much to Kim's benefit. It gives
him the room for maneuvering he badly needs to move forward without
putting his regime at risk. Still, nothing should be taken for granted:
As the last few months have proven, everything could suddenly change.
Niki J.P. Alsford is a reader in Asia Pacific Studies and director of the International Institute of Korean Studies at the University of Central Lancashire.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
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